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INTRODUCTION
The racing world breathed a long sigh of relief on May 22, 2008—
the date on which Bruton Smith, Chairman of Speedway Motorsports
1
Inc. (SMI), announced his intention to purchase Kentucky Speedway.
For the previous two years, Kentucky Speedway had been engaged in a
bitter antitrust battle against NASCAR involving the latter’s refusal to
2
award it a lucrative NEXTEL Cup race, and it appeared that all of the
necessary pieces were finally in place for a settlement agreement to be
3
reached. Kentucky Speedway had lost at the trial level, it was hemorrhaging money, and its investors were desperately trying to sell the
4
speedway. Thus, when Bruton Smith effectively conditioned the acquisition of the speedway on the lawsuit between Kentucky and NASCAR
5
ending, it seemed as though the three entities would naturally work together on a settlement that would be in all of their best interests. NASCAR could avoid the costs of an appeal, Bruton Smith could acquire the

1

Marty Smith, Key NASCAR Track Owner to Buy Kentucky Speedway, ESPN.COM, May
23, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/rpm/nascar/cup/news/story?id=3407605.
2
See Ky. Speedway, LLC v. NASCAR, No. 05-0138, 2008 WL 113987, at *1 (E.D. Ky.
Jan. 7, 2008), aff’d, 588 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2009).
3
See id. at *8 (granting NASCAR’s motion for summary judgment).
4
The investors were willing to sell the track for half of the price that they had
paid to construct it. See NASCAR Says It’s Too Late to Add Kentucky to 2009 Schedule,
CBSSPORTS.COM, May 23, 2008, http://www.cbssports.com/autoracing/story/10839377
(“Smith has not yet completed the speedway purchase, in which he agreed to pay $78.3
million for the track that cost $152 million to build.”). This desperation was understandable given the large debt that the speedway had incurred. See Bob Pockrass,
SMI: We Haven’t Made Decision on Kentucky Speedway Transaction, BUS. COURIER (Cincinnati), Aug. 7, 2008, http://cincinnati.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/stories/2008/08/
04/daily43.html (noting that the $78 million deal with SMI would include “$63 million
in debt assumption”).
5
While Bruton Smith was interested in Kentucky Speedway for its potential value in
holding a NEXTEL Cup race, NASCAR continually stressed that it would not consider
sanctioning such a race until its litigation with the previous owners of Kentucky Speedway was resolved. See Pockrass, supra note 4 (“Smith has said that as long as the current
owners continue their lawsuit, he cannot realign a race date to Kentucky.”). Smith included a provision in the acquisition contract allowing SMI to back out of the deal within ninety days, see id., and he knew that his success in obtaining the race
depended on the resolution of the lawsuit. See Bob Pockrass, Smith Not Saying Which
SMI Track Could Lose Date to Kentucky, SCENEDAILY.COM, June 17, 2008, http://
www.scenedaily.com/news/articles/nationwideseries/Smith_not_saying_which_SMI_track
_could_lose_date_to_Kentucky.html (reporting Smith’s acknowledgment that, in order to
get the race that he wanted, “the key would be for the current Kentucky Speedway
ownership group to settle or drop its federal antitrust lawsuit against NASCAR”).
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speedway for a fraction of its value, and Kentucky Speedway’s shareholders could be bailed out of their failing investment.
6
Given the prevalence of settlement in federal lawsuits, the parties’
lawyers were likely quite familiar with an immediate concern of their
clients—ensuring that their statements to the opposing party over the
course of settlement negotiations would not expose them to future
7
8
liability. The lawyers likely turned to Federal Rule of Evidence 408 to
explore the specific protection that their clients could enjoy during
the course of the settlement proceedings. There is a wealth of case
law and academic literature to which these practitioners may have
turned for answers concerning the application of this Rule to settle9
ment communications between the parties, and it is clear that it would
have afforded protection to such communications directly between
10
NASCAR and Kentucky Speedway.
An interesting issue must have surfaced, however, when the practitioners considered the consequences of Bruton Smith—a nonparty to
the litigation—being involved in the settlement proceedings. Neither
the most thorough inspection of the Rule nor the most detailed analysis
of its accompanying advisory note would have yielded a sufficient answer to the question whether communications between Bruton Smith
and one of the parties to the litigation, in furtherance of settlement
11
with the other party, would have been protected. Such a settlement

6

See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1285 n.129 (2002) (“[B]y most estimates, approximately seventy percent of all cases filed in federal court end in pretrial settlement.”).
7
See Fred S. Hjelmeset, Impeachment of Party by Prior Inconsistent Statement in Compromise Negotiations: Admissibility Under Federal Rule of Evidence 408, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
75, 110 (1995) (“[T]he almost unavoidable impact of disclosure about compromise is
that juries will consider the evidence as a concession of liability, and the tendency of
juries to disregard instructions is so well known that the admission of the evidence for
even a limited purpose would result in a frustration of the policy of encouraging settlements.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted)).
8
Rule 408 describes the conditions under which statements made in the course of
settlement negotiations are inadmissible.
9
See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 955, 957-82 (1988) (exploring the scope and limitations of Rule 408’s
protection of communications made between parties to a litigation).
10
See FED. R. EVID. 408(a) (noting the conditions under which “conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim” are “not admissible on
behalf of any party”).
11
Specifically, the issue is whether communications to a nonparty (e.g., Bruton
Smith) in furtherance of settlement would constitute “compromise negotiations” and
thus warrant protection under the Rule—an issue on which the Rule is silent.
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scenario would arguably further the policy goals underlying the Rule
and be enormously advantageous to everyone involved. There is no
case law, though, to guide practitioners encountering such a situation,
and the academic literature is similarly silent.
When confronted with this issue, practitioners are thus forced either to forgo potentially beneficial interactions with third parties
(people like Bruton Smith) or to proceed with an imperfect understanding of their clients’ potential exposure to liability resulting from
admissions or concessions made in such communications. This void
in both the literature and the case law is particularly troubling given
the increasing complexity of settlement negotiations and the underlying disputes. In addition, given the growth of mergers and acquisi13
tions and the involvement of third-party “specialists” to whom parties
convey a wide variety of sensitive information, the Bruton Smith example might even begin to seem relatively simple. Practitioners are
responsible for protecting their clients from harm during the course
of settlement proceedings, and it is essential that the issue of nonparty
communications be clarified in order to provide practitioners with
necessary direction.
This Comment presents an initial analysis of the applicability of
Rule 408 to communications made by a party to a nonparty in fur14
therance of a settlement with another party to the dispute. Given the
lack of direct authority regarding this issue, I rely on a textual analysis
of the Rule itself, an examination of the public policy considerations
motivating the Rule’s enactment, and an analysis of the applicability
of this Rule to other, similar situations within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts of appeals, in order to provide recommendations to
practitioners facing this issue.
In Part I, I present an overview of the origins and foundations of
the Rules concerning the secrecy of settlement communications and
offer a brief description of some of the issues resulting from the Rules’
12

See infra Section II.B.
Joseph H. Flom, Mergers & Acquisitions: The Decade in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 753, 773-74 (2000).
14
For shorthand, this Comment sometimes refers to this simply as “the issue.”
The Comment will also briefly discuss the settlement privilege recently acknowledged,
under Rule 501, by the Sixth Circuit. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power
Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 981 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The public policy favoring secret negotiations, combined with the inherent questionability of the truthfulness of any
statements made therein, leads us to conclude that a settlement privilege should exist
. . . .”). Because the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit in which the privilege applies,
though, this Comment will largely focus on the general applicability of Rule 408.
13
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ambiguity. I then argue that the applicability of these Rules to nonparties involved with settlement negotiations has yet to be adequately
addressed, note the probable reasons for this being the case, and reflect on the necessity of a swift resolution to this failure.
In Part II, I engage in a textual, policy-based, and common law
analysis of the applicability of Rule 408 to nonparty settlement communications under the jurisdiction of the federal courts of appeals.
In so doing, I find that the terms of the Rule, its underlying policy,
and its current application to analogous cases suggest that the federal
circuits would look favorably upon protecting nonparty communications in furtherance of settlement.
In Part III, I present circuit-specific recommendations to practitioners based on the results of my analysis in Part II. I argue that practitioners should feel most comfortable engaging in nonparty settlement communications in the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits; that practitioners should feel less, but still reasonably, comfortable engaging in such communications in the First and Ninth Circuits; and that there is insufficient case law upon which to base a conclusion in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits.
Finally, I argue that because the federal courts of appeals have acknowledged a broad policy of encouraging the settlement of lawsuits
under Rule 408, it would not be inherently unreasonable for parties to
engage in such communications—even in the more ambiguous circuits—when the communications would be particularly advantageous.
I. PROTECTING THE DRIVERS: THE FEDERAL RULES CONCERNING THE
SECRECY OF SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATIONS
Before I analyze the applicability of the Rules concerning the
secrecy of settlement negotiations to nonparties to a litigation, it is
important to understand both the context in which these Rules arose
and the current issues resulting from their ambiguity. I explain the
absence of an adequate discussion of the issue and emphasize the importance of reaching a resolution.
A. Rule 408
Federal Rule of Evidence 408, entitled “Compromise and Offers to
Compromise,” concerns the admissibility of settlement offers and other
15
communications made during the course of settlement negotiations.
15

FED. R. EVID. 408.
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It provides, in its current amended form, that “offering . . . or accepting . . . valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise [a] claim” and “conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations regarding [a] claim” are “not admissible on behalf of any
party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a
claim that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach through
16
a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction.”
The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules has noted two principal motivations behind the enactment of Rule 408: First, the Rule seeks
to guard against the admission of statements made in compromise negotiations because of the statements’ questionable evidentiary value; as
settlement is often “motivated by a desire for peace rather than from
any concession of weakness of position,” the use of these statements in
17
another context may be highly misleading. Second, the Rule seeks to
further the general public policy of encouraging settlement of law18
suits. Successful settlement negotiations are vital to ensuring that the
federal courts remain productive and efficient, and Rule 408 attempts
to encourage settlement discourse by freeing individuals from the worry
that their statements may expose them to future liability.
As is the case with many of the Rules of Evidence, the federal
courts have yet to implement a consistent judicial philosophy regard19
ing the proper scope and application of Rule 408, and the Supreme
Court has yet to produce an opinion addressing the Rule. Given that
20
settlement negotiations are involved in most federal lawsuits, the
academic community has understandably developed a keen interest in
attending to the various ambiguities inherent in Rule 408. There has
been a wealth of scholarship concerning the types of settlement communications covered by the Rule and the safeguards that parties must
employ in order to ensure the Rule’s applicability to the precise cir21
cumstances of their litigation.
16

Id.
FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note.
18
Id.
19
See Constar Int’l, Inc. v. Ball Plastic Container Corp., No. 05-0669, 2006 WL
6021150, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2006) (“Courts are all over the map on how to apply Rule 408.”).
20
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
21
See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 9, at 955, 957-82 (discussing “how far [Rule 408’s]
promise of confidentiality extends and the circumstances under which it would permit
communications made during settlement negotiations to be admitted into evidence at
trial”); Mikah K. Story Thompson, To Speak or Not to Speak? Navigating the Treacherous
Waters of Parallel Investigations Following the Amendment of Federal Rule of Evidence 408, 76
17
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Such scholarship, however, has generally been limited to the context of negotiations taking place directly between two adverse parties
to a litigation. Even when the issue of nonparties has been broached
in the literature and case law, it has only been with regard to ancillary
third parties entering into a preexisting dispute and bringing their
own claims against the defendant. The situation is generally as follows: Party A is involved in a lawsuit with Party B. Nonparty C considers engaging in its own litigation against B arising out of the lawsuit
between A and B, and then B and C settle. A now wants both to discover and to admit evidence of the terms of this settlement agreement
or communications made therein. The courts have clearly held, how22
ever, that the admission of such evidence is barred by Rule 408. Although the settlement agreement between B and C arose out of the
23
lawsuit between A and B, it is still a “compromise negotiation[]” within the scope of the Rule.
This example, of course, is distinct from a situation in which a party to a litigation communicates with a nonparty in furtherance of a settlement with another party. In the latter situation, B and C are not engaged in any dispute arising from the original lawsuit and are not
communicating in hopes of reaching a settlement agreement between
themselves. Rather, B is communicating with C in the hope of coming
to an agreement with A. The interesting issue, then, is whether the
scope of Rule 408 extends to “conduct or statements made in com24
promise negotiations” when B is not compromising with C but rather
is communicating with C in order to further her compromise negotiation with A. That is, does the protection of Rule 408 extend to communications made by a party involved in a lawsuit to a nonparty when
such communications are in furtherance of a settlement with another
party to the dispute?
Unfortunately, both Rule 408 and its accompanying advisory notes
are silent on this issue, and neither the academic literature nor case
law provides any sufficient discussion of the issue. This void may be
due to a variety of different factors. With regard to an absence of case
U. CIN. L. REV. 939, 940 (2008) (discussing Rule 408’s inapplicability to statements
made to government officials during settlement negotations and how this “creates an
inconspicuous trap awaiting any person who is the subject of a civil investigation by a
governmental body,” as “admissions of fault made during those settlement talks can
become the basis for a later criminal proceeding”).
22
See, e.g., United States v. Contra Costa County Water Dist., 678 F.2d 90, 91-92
(9th Cir. 1982).
23
FED. R. EVID. 408.
24
Id.
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law, it may be that parties are unlikely to communicate with nonparties in furtherance of a settlement with another party precisely because they are unaware of their potential liabilities for doing so. As to
the void in the literature, it may be that the wealth of other uncertain25
ties concerning the scope and application of Rule 408 has led to a
broader academic discourse surrounding the Rule.
Regardless of the specific reasons for the absence of a significant
discussion of this issue, such a failure must quickly be resolved. Settlement negotiations are becoming as complicated and far-reaching as
the transactions and disputes at their foundation, and interested third
parties are increasingly attempting to become involved in their resolution. Indeed, settlement negotiations surrounding mergers and acquisitions—a context in which this issue is likely to arise—have never
been as complex as they have become in recent history. Practitioners
are currently forced either to forgo potentially beneficial communications with nonparties or to participate in such communications with
an imperfect understanding of their resulting potential for future liability under Rule 408. The scope of Rule 408’s protection in this area
must be explored and clarified in order to provide direction to practitioners accountable for the course of settlement negotiations.
B. Rule 501 and the Settlement Privilege
While not the focus of this Comment, a discussion of the Rules
protecting the secrecy of settlement negotiations would be incomplete
without an introduction to the newly acknowledged settlement privilege under Rule 501. Unlike Rule 408’s concern with the admissibility
of evidence, Rule 501 provides the general guidelines by which courts
may recognize the existence of privileges preventing the very discoverability of evidence. The broad language of Rule 501 states that the recognition of privileges “shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience,” except as otherwise required by
26
the laws of the United States. The Supreme Court has noted that
Rule 501 allows the federal courts to recognize privileges not previously enjoyed under the common law so long as the recognition promotes

25

See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Lauderdale, A New Trend in the Law of Privilege: The Federal Settlement Privilege and the Proper Use of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 for the Recognition of New
Privileges, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 306-09 (2005) (discussing various uncertainties
raised when trying to reconcile Rule 408 with the settlement privilege).
26
FED. R. EVID. 501.
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a public interest that is “sufficiently important . . . to outweigh the need
27
for probative evidence” and the recognition is consistent with the
28
“reason and experience” of federal jurisprudence.
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., the Sixth
Circuit became the first circuit to recognize the existence of a general
29
“settlement privilege” under Rule 501. The issue before the court
was “whether statements made in furtherance of settlement are privileged and protected from third-party discovery” when a plaintiff
sought discovery of communications made during settlement negotia30
tions between the two defendants to his claim. While the court readily noted that Rule 408 was not on point because it applies to admissibility and not discoverability, it elected to recognize a general set31
settlement privilege under Rule 501. Having analyzed the historical
development of various protections for settlement communications in
the common law, the court stated that “[v]iewed in the light of reason
and experience, we believe a settlement privilege serves a sufficiently
32
important public interest, and therefore should be recognized.” The
court thus denied discovery of the statements made in furtherance of
33
the settlement negotiations.
While this settlement privilege goes beyond Rule 408’s provision
of inadmissibility and makes settlement communications undiscoverable, the policy goals inherent in the Goodyear court’s recognition of
the privilege are identical to the policy goals underlying Rule 408:
34
encouraging the settlement of lawsuits and shielding from discovery
35
potentially misleading and contextually driven statements.
In addition to sharing similar purposes with Rule 408, the settlement privilege has similar ambiguities. As with Rule 408, the federal
27

Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (holding that communications
made between patient and psychotherapist are privileged).
29
332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir. 2003).
30
Id. at 977.
31
Id. at 979-81.
32
Id. at 980 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33
Id. at 983.
34
Compare id. at 980 (“The ability to negotiate and settle a case without trial fosters
a more efficient, more cost-effective, and significantly less burdened judicial system. In
order for settlement talks to be effective, parties must feel uninhibited in their communications.”), with supra text accompanying note 18.
35
Compare 332 F.3d at 981 (recognizing that settlement negotiations frequently
include “puffing and posturing” and that allowing discovery of such statements “would
be highly misleading if allowed to be used for purposes other than settlement” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with supra text accompanying note 17.
28
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courts have yet to adopt a consistent philosophy regarding the nature
36
of the settlement privilege. Most significantly, the Sixth Circuit is cur37
rently the only circuit even to acknowledge its existence. While most
courts have simply failed to reach the issue of this privilege on the me38
rits, a number of them have outright rejected the privilege, arguing
39
that the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion was unjustified. And, even where
the existence of this privilege is accepted, there is no clear consensus
40
among the district courts as to its proper scope and application. The
41
broad language of the Goodyear holding and the absence of advisory
committee notes to aid in Rule 501’s interpretation leave the settlement privilege riddled with even more uncertainties than Rule 408.
It is not surprising, given its similar purpose and ambiguity, that issues pertaining to the settlement privilege have enjoyed the same
wealth of discourse in the literature as those involving its Rule 408
42
counterpart. There has been a great deal of debate within the academic community as to the specific types of settlement communications
36

Compare Lauderdale, supra note 25, at 306-13 (discussing several “issues [that]
exist regarding the substantive scope and application of the [settlement] privilege”),
with supra note 19 and accompanying text.
37
Cf. Lauderdale, supra note 25, at 259 (“In [Goodyear] the Sixth Circuit became
the first federal court to recognize a ‘settlement privilege’—a privilege between adverse parties for communications made at the bargaining table while attempting to settle a dispute.”).
38
See, e.g., United States v. Williams Cos., 562 F.3d 387, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (declining to address the issue of settlement privilege because it was not properly raised in
the district court); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, 439 F.3d 740, 742, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (deeming “premature” a consideration of the merits of the settlement-privilege claim because the party claiming the privilege failed to meet its burden of showing that the allegedly protected documents were
a part of settlement negotiations).
39
See Ray v. BlueHippo Funding, LLC, No. 06-1807, 2008 WL 3399392, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008) (refusing to acknowledge a federal settlement privilege); Bd. of
Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 253 F.R.D. 521, 523 (C.D.
Cal. 2008) (same); Newman & Assocs. v. J.K. Harris & Co., No. 04-9264, 2005 WL
3610140, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005) (“Under federal law, courts have generally
declined to recognize a privilege that would preclude discovery for the purpose of settlements or settlement negotiations. . . . To the extent that defendants rely on the existence of such a privilege, their argument fails as a matter of law.”).
40
See Irwin Seating Co. v. IBM Corp., No. 04-0568, 2007 WL 518866, at *3-4 (W.D.
Mich. Feb. 15, 2007) (holding that, while Goodyear did not provide direct guidance on
the issue, a magistrate judge’s decision to strike the plaintiff’s expert testimony because
the plaintiff had revealed to the experts confidential information obtained during
mediation before the experts testified was not clearly erroneous or unduly harsh).
41
See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 983
(6th Cir. 2003) (“In sum, any communications made in furtherance of settlement are
privileged.”).
42
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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43

covered by the Rule, the exact degree to which such communications
44
can be disclosed, and the safeguards that a party must employ in order
45
to ensure the applicability of the privilege to the party’s litigation.
There is controversy as to whether the Sixth Circuit was even justified in
creating the privilege, with some academics contending that the court’s
46
historical analysis was inaccurate and its general reasoning inadequate.
The contours of such scholarship, however, have likewise been limited to the context of settlement negotiations taking place directly
between two adverse parties to litigation. There has been no discussion in the courts or in the literature about whether the settlement
privilege extends to communications made by a party involved in a
lawsuit to a nonparty when such communications are in furtherance of
a party’s settlement. In the Rule 501 context, however, the reasons for
the lack of discourse are far clearer than in the case of Rule 408. Given the groundbreaking nature of the settlement privilege, its adoption
only seven years ago, and the current circuit split regarding its acceptance, far more pressing concerns regarding the acknowledgment of
47
this privilege have diverted the attention of courts and scholars alike.
The academic interest in the “bigger picture” presented by the settlement privilege, however, does nothing to address the specific concerns of everyday practitioners who are responsible for guiding clients
in their communications with nonparties. As in situations involving
Rule 408, these practitioners are currently forced either to forgo potentially beneficial communications with nonparties or to participate in
such communications with an imperfect understanding of the communications’ discoverability. Clients negotiating with extremely sensitive
information may not be content knowing that their communications
43

See, e.g., Lauderdale, supra note 25, at 309-10 (noting that Goodyear left open the
precise definition of “settlement negotiations” and that it remains unsettled “whether
the privilege applies to forms of alternative dispute resolution such as mediation or
arbitration”).
44
See id. at 308-09 (arguing that Goodyear intended to create a privilege against discovery but that disclosure should also be barred).
45
See id. at 306-07 (noting that “it is unclear to what extent one [party] can prevent the disclosure of communications by the other” and that “it remains an open
question as to what happens should one party disregard the privilege and reveal such
information to a third party”).
46
See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 21, at 985-88 (discussing the controversy over
whether the Goodyear court correctly applied precedent in reaching its ruling).
47
For a discussion of such concerns—including “whether and how the settlement
privilege can be reconciled with the provisions in Rule 408,” how “settlement negotiation” should be defined, and “whether the privilege can attach before litigation”—see
Lauderdale, supra note 25, at 305-13.
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may be inadmissible but perhaps discoverable, and they certainly do not
appreciate the ambiguity. The scope of the settlement privilege’s protection of communications made by a party to a nonparty must be explored and clarified in order to provide sufficient direction for practitioners responsible for taking such issues into account.
In sum, while there has been a great deal of discussion surrounding both Rule 408 and the settlement privilege, it has been limited to
issues regarding settlement communications directly between parties
to a dispute. There has yet to be any significant headway in either the
academic literature or the case law concerning application of either
Rule 408 or the privilege to communications made by a party to a
nonparty in furtherance of a settlement with another party. Given the
mounting complexity of settlement negotiations and the increasing
demand for nonparty involvement in such compromises, it is essential
that this void in the literature be addressed by a developing discussion
that takes the issue of nonparty settlement communications seriously.
II. NAVIGATING THE TRACK: NONPARTY SETTLEMENT
COMMUNICATIONS IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
Having acknowledged this dearth of discourse, I now analyze the
applicability of Rule 408 to communications made by a party to a
nonparty in furtherance of settlement with another party. In doing
so, I find that the terms of the Rule, its underlying policy, and its current application to analogous situations within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts of appeals suggest that its protections apply to these
communications. Because the settlement privilege arose from the
same policy considerations underlying Rule 408, I will at times discuss
the privilege in order to further elucidate the discussion.
A. Textual Analysis
The textual provisions of Rule 408 are not facially limited to settlement communications between parties to a litigation. In fact, the
terms suggest a broad scope of protection for communications made
in furtherance of settlement, without restrictions on the recipient of
such communications. That is, Rule 408 seems more concerned with
the nature of what is said than with to whom it is said; it simply protects
communications made in furtherance of settlement.
For instance, Rule 408 states that offers “attempting to compromise [a] claim” and “conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding [a] claim” are to be afforded the Rule’s protec-

9 ALBERT REVISED FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

Rule 408 and Communications to Nonparties

3/17/2010 7:00 PM

1211

48

tion. In tying the Rule’s protection to the type of communication
made rather than to the relationship between the speaker and the recipient of the communication, the drafters of Rule 408 may have anticipated situations in which compromise negotiations would not
merely be directly between the parties to the dispute. In fact, evidence scholars have noted that the choice of words employed by the
Rule suggests that it was intended to have a significantly broader scope
49
than a literal application would provide.
Similarly, the settlement privilege articulated by the Goodyear court
appears to have been focused more on the nature of the settlement
communication than on its recipient. Nowhere did the court state or
imply that the settlement privilege should be construed as limited to
communications made directly between the parties; rather, its reasoning focused on offering protection to settlement communications surrounding the claim itself. In fact, the court broadly concluded that
“any communications made in furtherance of settlement are privi50
leged.” Such an expansive statement appears to entail that communications in furtherance of settlement, regardless of the relationship
between the parties, are to be privileged.
The fact that Rule 408 and the settlement privilege appear to focus
on the nature of a communication rather than on the individual to
whom it was made lends support to the proposition that communications made to a nonparty, so long as they were in furtherance of a settlement with a party to the dispute, would be both inadmissible and
51
privileged to the extent that the Rules otherwise applied. However, it
is also important to note that, given the inherent ambiguity of the text,
the mere fact that the text is consistent with such an interpretation
does not necessarily mean that the Rules were intended to encompass
such a situation. I thus turn away from a facial evaluation of these
Rules and toward an examination of their foundational principles.

48

FED. R. EVID. 408(a) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE
MANUAL, STUDENT EDITION § 7.05[1][b] (8th ed. 2007) (“If either [party] makes an
offer of compromise to a person other than the other potential litigant, the offer
should be protected by exclusionary treatment.”).
50
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 983
(6th Cir. 2003).
51
Rule 408(b) identifies an example of when the Rules would nonetheless not apply: exclusion is not required for evidence “offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a),” such as “proving a witness’s bias or prejudice; negating a contention of
undue delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.”
49
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B. Foundational Policy
While the scope of Rule 408 is far from clear, the public policy
motivations at its foundation suggest that communications by a party
to a nonparty to further settlement with another party ought to be
protected. Such communications would be equally suspect as a means
by which to assess a party’s liability, and their protection would significantly further the general public policy of encouraging settlement in
order to promote judicial efficiency.
1. Avoiding Reliance on Statements of Suspect Evidentiary Value
In Part I, it was noted that one of the principal motivations behind
the enactment of Rule 408 was to guard against the admission of
statements made in compromise negotiations because of the state52
ments’ questionable evidentiary value. Because an offer to settle is
often “motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of position,” the use of statements made during
compromise negotiations in another context may be highly misleading.53 The Goodyear court, in describing its motivation for acknowledging a settlement privilege, similarly noted that there is an “inherent
questionability of the truthfulness of any statements made” during
54
compromise negotiations, as parties may make admissions or engage
in conduct in order to bring peace for the “unique purpose of settle55
ment negotiations.”

52

See supra text accompanying note 17.
FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note. The federal courts of appeals have
similarly acknowledged the importance of this policy. See, e.g., EEOC v. UMB Bank Fin.
Corp., 558 F.3d 784, 791 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that one of the primary purposes of the
rule is “to guard against the admission of evidence that may not fairly represent the actual value or merits of a claim” (citing FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note));
United States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that “the evidence is
irrelevant, as the compromise at issue may have been motivated by a desire for peace
rather than any concession as to the merits of the party’s position” (citing FED. R. EVID.
408 advisory committee’s note)); McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247 (1st Cir.
1985) (noting that evidence obtained from compromise negotiations “is of questionable
relevance on the issue of liability or the value of a claim, since settlement may well reflect a desire for peaceful dispute resolution, rather than the litigants’ perceptions of
the strength or weakness of their relative positions”); United States v. Contra Costa
County Water Dist., 678 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that such evidence is “irrelevant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the claim” (citing FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note)).
54
332 F.3d at 981.
55
Id. (quoting Cook v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1990)).
53
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These policy considerations noted by both the Rules Advisory
Committee and the Goodyear court are quite understandable. During
a settlement negotiation, a party may well be willing to make certain
admissions or concessions solely for the purpose of bringing about a
speedy or cost-effective solution to a dispute. Rather than maintaining a truthful or principled stance regarding actual liability, a party
may bend and waver for a number of reasons that have nothing to do
with underlying guilt or innocence. The party may simply want to
avoid the hassle, bad publicity, or significant cost that litigation may
entail, and she may say or do anything to bring about such a result.
Because there is thus an “inherent questionability of the truthful56
ness” of any communications that such a party would make in furtherance of the settlement, it is in the interest of good public policy to
ensure that an individual is not exposed to liability on the basis of
these questionable statements.
If the courts are genuinely concerned with the inherent truthfulness of statements made in the pursuit of settlement, then such a policy consideration must necessarily extend to the type of statements at
issue here. Whether a party engages in settlement communications
with another party or nonparty, the underlying motivation is the very
57
desire for settlement that offers little utility in attributing liability.
That is, the very nature of a settlement communication is of questionable probative value because it may be motivated by factors independent of any inherent truth. So long as an individual communicates
with a nonparty in genuine furtherance of a settlement with a party,
the truthfulness of such communications is as suspect as if the individual were communicating with the party directly. There is no logical
distinction between these two cases with regard to this specific policy
motivation, as there is no reason to believe that the latter communications would have greater probative value than the former.
Thus, to the extent that courts are concerned about the future
admission of statements made for the “unique purpose of settlement
58
negotiations,” such concern should apply to all such statements offered for the “unique purpose of settlement.” This category certainly
covers communications made by a party to a nonparty in furtherance
of a settlement with another party, because the Rule is principally
concerned with the type of statement to be protected.

56
57
58

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 17.
Goodyear, 332 F.3d at 981 (quoting Cook, 132 F.R.D. at 554).
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2. Promoting Judicial Efficiency Through Settlement
Far beyond providing a check against the suspect evidentiary value
of settlement communications, the overwhelming purpose of Rule
408—as acknowledged by both the drafters of the Rule and the courts
of appeals applying it—is to encourage the settlement of lawsuits in
59
order to advance judicial efficiency. The primary goal of the enactment of Rule 408 was to encourage the promotion of the public policy
favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes that would oth60
erwise be discouraged with the admission of such evidence. The
federal courts of appeals have acknowledged this foundational policy
61
and its underlying utility. In recognizing the settlement privilege
59

See supra text accompanying note 18.
See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (calling the promotion of public
policy favoring settlement a “more consistently impressive ground” for the Rule than
the reliability of evidence produced during settlement).
61
See EEOC v. UMB Bank Fin. Corp., 558 F.3d 784, 791 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting
that the purpose of Rule 408 is “to foster open discussions and out-of-court settlements” (citing FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note)); Stockman v. Oakcrest
Dental Ctr., P.C., 480 F.3d 791, 805 (6th Cir. 2007) (arguing that the purpose of Rule
408 is “the promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of
disputes that would otherwise be discouraged with the admission of such evidence”
(citation omitted)); United States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that one of the justifications for Rule 408 is that “the exclusion promotes settlement of disputes” (citing FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note)); Zurich Am.
Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., Inc., 417 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The primary policy
reason for excluding settlement communications is that the law favors out-of-court settlements, and allowing offers of compromise to be used as admissions of liability might
chill voluntary efforts at dispute resolution.”); EEOC v. Gear Petroleum, Inc., 948 F.2d
1542, 1545-46 (10th Cir. 1991) (“The philosophy of the Rule is to allow the parties to
drop their guard and to talk freely and loosely without fear that a concession made to
advance negotiations will be used at trial.” (quoting STEVEN A. SALTZBURG & KENNETH
R. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 286 (4th ed. 1986))); Trebor
Sportswear Co. v. Ltd. Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1989) (acknowledging
that Rule 408 supports the “public policy of encouraging settlements and avoiding
wasteful litigation”); Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy, 856 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir.
1988) (“The public policy of favoring and encouraging settlement makes necessary the
inadmissibility of settlement negotiations in order to foster frank discussions.”); McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that “the rule illustrates
Congress’ desire to promote a public policy favoring the compromise and settlement
of claims by insulating potential litigants from later being penalized in court for their
attempts to first resolve their dispute out of court”); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 273 n.39 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Chief Judge Seitz believes that it is
the purpose of Rule 408 to encourage settlements by shielding the parties to a settlement from liability based on the fact of settlement or on statements made in settlement negotiations.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); United States v. Contra Costa County Water
Dist., 678 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1982) (“By preventing settlement negotiations from being admitted as evidence, full and open disclosure is encouraged, thereby furthering
60
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under Rule 501, the Sixth Circuit noted that the privilege shared Rule
408’s goal of promoting a “public policy favoring secret negotia62
tions.” It argued that “[t]he ability to negotiate and settle a case
without trial fosters a more efficient, more cost-effective, and signifi63
cantly less burdened judicial system.” In order to attain this goal,
parties must be allowed “to make hypothetical concessions, offer creative quid pro quos, and generally make statements that would otherwise
belie their litigation efforts” without fear that such information may
64
later be used against them.
It seems that protecting a party’s settlement communications with
a nonparty could only encourage the settlement of lawsuits. There are
certainly times when an interested nonparty to a lawsuit may be vital to
65
the success of any settlement negotiations that take place. If such negotiations would leave parties open to future liability, however, it would
seriously limit their ability to compromise on any aspect of the claim, as
they would be forced to entertain an understandable worry. In order
to promote the public policy favoring the settlement of such disputes,
the federal courts should be eager to ensure that the party has the necessary freedom of discussion with regard to compromises.
As a concrete example of how the protection of such nonparty
communications would further the foundational public policy goals of
this Rule, recall the previous discussion of NASCAR, Bruton Smith,
66
and Kentucky Speedway. Without a successful settlement, the complicated antitrust case between NASCAR and Kentucky Speedway
67
would certainly have led to a more “burdened” Sixth Circuit. A settlement seemingly would have been impossible without the interven68
tion of Bruton Smith, a nonparty to the litigation. Such an arrangement of three distinct individuals seeking their own advancement
while incidentally benefiting the entire court system seems to be the

the policy toward settlement.”); Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097, 1106 (5th
Cir. Unit B May 1981) (“This rule is designed to encourage settlements by fostering
free and full discussion of the issues.”).
62
Goodyear, 332 F.3d at 981.
63
Id. at 980.
64
Id.
65
See, e.g., supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
66
Id.
67
See Goodyear, 332 F.3d at 980 (“The ability to negotiate and settle a case without
trial fosters a . . . significantly less burdened judicial system.”).
68
Without Smith, Kentucky would have had nothing to gain and thus no substantial reason to agree to a settlement with NASCAR.
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69

very type of “creative quid pro quos” that the courts seek to encourage.
Furthermore, it cannot seriously be doubted that this settlement arrangement would “otherwise be discouraged with the admission of
70
such evidence.” NASCAR would likely never have dared to make the
necessary concessions or admissions that such negotiations involve to
either Kentucky Speedway or Bruton Smith if there were a risk that a
different speedway could subsequently use such statements as proof of
liability. Thus, the protection of communications made by parties to
nonparties to a dispute furthers the public policy encouraging the settlement of lawsuits, and the absence of such protection would weaken
that policy’s goal.
C. Similar Cases
While the federal courts of appeals thus acknowledge the powerful
71
foundational policies at the heart of Rule 408, such broad considerations alone do not provide sufficient guidance to practitioners concerned with the specific scope of a circuit court’s application of the
Rule. Indeed, in discussing the goals of Rule 408, the courts have
noted that it would be erroneous to take the view that “any recognition
of statements made during settlement will ruin the freedom of com72
munication with respect to compromise that the Rule protects.” Although the federal courts of appeals have yet to entertain a case specifically concerning whether the scope of Rule 408 encompasses
communications made by a party to a nonparty in furtherance of settlement, an examination of how the courts have dealt with similar ambiguities under the Rule suggests that the Rule’s protection would extend to such circumstances.
1. Internal Work Product
The most significant support for extending Rule 408’s protection
to the issue is found within the courts of appeals’ treatment of a party’s internal work product, which—while prepared in furtherance of
settlement—was never intended to be communicated to the opposing
party. Despite the fact that Rule 408 does not directly address this sit69

Goodyear, 332 F.3d at 980.
Stockman v. Oakcrest Dental Ctr., P.C., 480 F.3d 791, 805 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71
See supra notes 53, 61.
72
Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70
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uation, several circuits have found that the Rule affords protection to
such internal communications regarding settlement, whether they are
73
74
75
formal memoranda, reports, accounting materials, or even hand76
written notes prepared informally. Such decisions are especially significant to this Comment’s issue because they suggest that these courts
are more concerned with promoting the underlying policy considerations behind Rule 408 than they are with limiting the Rule’s application to communications directly between parties.
In the most recent treatment of internal work product, the Eighth
Circuit has echoed the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits’ sentiments
in stating that the spirit of Rule 408, “as recognized by several circuits . . . , supports the exclusion of certain work product . . . created
specifically for the purpose of conciliation, even if not communicated
77
to the other party.” In dealing with the ambiguity, the court noted
that the purposes of the Rule were “to foster open discussions and outof-court settlements and to guard against the admission of evidence
78
that may not fairly represent the actual value or merits of a claim.”
Given that protecting internal work product would further the policy
goals of Rule 408, the court noted that it found the other circuits’ reasoning persuasive and agreed that it was “appropriate to view Rule 408
as being sufficiently broad to encompass” the internally communi79
cated material.
It is reasonable to believe that the courts of appeals that have acknowledged the applicability of Rule 408 to internal settlement communications based on policy considerations would also find the Rule
applicable to the issue here. The previous discussion already found
that nonparty settlement communications significantly further the

73

See Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521, 528-30 (3d Cir.
1995) (holding that Rule 408 bars the admission of internal memoranda prepared for
settlement negotiations).
74
See Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097, 1107 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981)
(holding that an internal report “made in the course of an effort to compromise” was
properly excluded under Rule 408).
75
See Blu-J, Inc. v. Kemper C.P.A. Group, 916 F.2d 637, 641-42 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that an accountant’s report prepared for the purpose of compromise negotiations was properly excluded).
76
See EEOC v. UMB Bank Fin. Corp., 558 F.3d 784, 791 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding
that Rule 408 applied to a “handwritten . . . document memorializing notes” taken by a
job counselor while discussing damages “as part of the conciliation process”).
77
Id.
78
Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note).
79
Id.
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80

policy goals at the foundation of Rule 408, and there does not appear to be a relevant distinction between the preparation of an internal memorandum and an external memorandum to a nonparty if they
are both in furtherance of settlement with the other party to the dispute. The courts’ strong emphasis on policy and their unwillingness
to draw the line with particular relationships demonstrate their concern for promoting the settlement of lawsuits and for protecting
communications that are genuinely in furtherance of such settlement.
Thus, one could reasonably expect courts that apply Rule 408 to internal settlement communications to likewise apply the Rule to nonparty communications in furtherance of settlement.
2. Third-Party Settlements
Several of the federal courts of appeals have held that Rule 408 is
applicable to settlement communications between a party to a dispute
81
and an adverse nonparty entering the original dispute. Recall, of
course, that such a situation is conceptually distinct from the one
82
here. For instance, if Bruton Smith decided to sue NASCAR with
claims arising from its original dispute with Kentucky Speedway, then
these courts would hold that NASCAR’s communications in furtherance of a settlement with Bruton Smith would be afforded protection,
as these two would now effectively be parties to a new dispute. Here,
in contrast, the concern is NASCAR’s communications with a nonparty, with which it has no dispute, in furtherance of a settlement with
the party to the original dispute.
The significance of these decisions lies not in the specific facts of
the cases but rather in the reasoning that the courts employed in order to address the ambiguity in Rule 408. In McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc.,

80

See supra Section II.B.
See, e.g., Hudspeth v. Comm’r, 914 F.2d 1207, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding
that the plaintiffs’ “contention that Rule 408 does not apply when third party compromises are involved is not tenable” because of the Rule’s underlying policy); McInnis
v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that while “[t]he settlement
agreement at issue here was entered into between a litigant and a third party, rather
than between the two litigants themselves, . . . the policies underlying the exclusionary
rule are equally applicable to such a situation”). While the D.C. Circuit has not specifically addressed this issue, its district courts have looked favorably on similar decisions
by other circuits. See, e.g., C & E Servs., Inc. v. Ashland Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 316, 31920 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing other circuits and noting that “[t]he very policy underlying
Rule 408 would be defeated if it did not operate to preclude the admissibility of settlement discussions in a case involving another party or another claim”).
82
See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
81
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for instance, the First Circuit was forced to confront the issue of
whether “a plaintiff who ha[d] accepted payment from a third party
against whom he ha[d] a claim” was entitled to Rule 408’s protec83
tion. After initially determining that the Rule’s policy called for the
protection of third-party compromise negotiations generally, it con84
fronted the novel issue of a plaintiff’s compromise by turning to the
twin policy goals underlying Rule 408. Because failing to extend Rule
408 to such a case would “discourage settlements” and be of questionable “relevance . . . to the validity of the claim,” the court found the
85
plaintiff’s compromise negotiations inadmissible. In so doing, the
court noted that “[i]f the policies underlying Rule 408 mandate that
settlements may not be admitted” in the traditional case, then “it is
axiomatic that those policies likewise prohibit the admission of set86
tlement evidence” in the novel case of a plaintiff’s settlement.
It is reasonable to believe that the courts of appeals that have specifically acknowledged an ambiguity in Rule 408’s treatment of thirdparty settlement negotiations arising from the initial dispute and that
have addressed this ambiguity by appealing to policy considerations
would look favorably on the issue here. Even when courts have failed
to extend the Rule’s protection to such a situation, it has often been
because “the settlement communications at issue arise out of a dispute
87
distinct from the one for which the evidence is being offered.” The
situation at issue here, however, deals with communications to a nonparty in furtherance of a settlement of the same dispute. Given the
previous discussion of how such nonparty settlement communications
88
would further the foundational policy of the Rule, these courts
would likely support the applicability of Rule 408 to this issue.
3. Purposes Other than Settlement
In addition to courts of appeals extending the applicability of
Rule 408 beyond its text to communications in furtherance of settle83

765 F.2d at 247.
The court acknowledged that other courts extending Rule 408 to cover thirdparty compromises generally dealt with “agreements between a defendant and a third
party to compromise a claim arising out of the same transaction as the one being litigated,” rather than agreements with a plaintiff. Id.
85
Id. at 247-48.
86
Id. at 247.
87
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., Inc., 417 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 2005); see
also id. at 689-90 (finding that evidence regarding the settlement of a claim different
from the one litigated was properly admitted).
88
See supra Section II.B.
84
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ment when conducive to policy goals, some courts have gone so far as
to apply the Rule to communications that could only vaguely be construed as used for settlement purposes. In EEOC v. Gear Petroleum, Inc.,
for instance, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a letter appeared to
be intended more for investigation purposes than for conciliation, but
it nonetheless allowed the letter to fall under the general umbrella of
a settlement communication, finding that “when the issue is doubtful,
the better practice is to exclude evidence of compromises or com89
promise offers.” Furthermore, once a document has been deemed a
settlement communication, other courts of appeals have demonstrated that the seriousness of Rule 408’s foundational public policy super90
sedes competing interests.
Because the primary concern of this Comment is to analyze
whether communications to nonparties in furtherance of party settlement constitute compromise negotiations under Rule 408, the opinions of these circuits are, admittedly, not particularly helpful. Nonetheless, they demonstrate that the courts are willing to transcend the
textual confines of Rule 408 and decide cases with overwhelming deference to the encouragement of settlement negotiations.
4. Mediation in the Sixth Circuit
Given the Sixth Circuit’s recognition of a broad settlement privilege above and beyond Rule 408, it is not surprising that a practitioner
confronted with this Comment’s issue would likely fare well in that
circuit. Because the Sixth Circuit’s broad respect for the secrecy of
settlement communications echoes that of other circuits, however,
and because the Sixth Circuit’s district courts’ specific reasoning with
regard to mediation is fascinating for this issue, Sixth Circuit case law
is nonetheless worth examining in more detail.
A recent Sixth Circuit district court opinion, Irwin Seating Co. v.
IBM Corp., recognized that, under the local court rules, “[a]ll ADR [alternative dispute resolution] proceedings are considered to be com89

948 F.2d 1542, 1544-46 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Bradbury v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 1356, 1364 (10th Cir. 1987)).
90
See Trebor Sportswear Co. v. Ltd. Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 509-11 (2d Cir.
1989) (citing the powerful public policy behind Rule 408 and finding that documents
introduced to satisfy the statute of frauds were to be excluded because they were originally settlement communications); Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy, 856 F.2d 652,
653-55 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the public policy behind Rule 408 necessitates that
the Rule be “broader than the common law exclusionary rule” and “exclude[] from
evidence all statements made in the course of settlement negotiations” despite competing interests in admitting evidence).
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promise negotiations within the meaning of Federal Rules [sic] of
91
Evidence 408.” The court noted that the scope of Rule 408’s protection includes a party’s communications to an ADR mediator in fur92
therance of a settlement with another party. While the concept of
the mediation privilege is distinct from this Comment’s inquiry, the
inclusion of the mediator under Rule 408 suggests that these district
courts intend to give parties enormous latitude to involve nonparties
in the mediation and settlement process. In fact, the court noted that
such negotiations need not be conducted “under the auspices of the
court” because the same public interest is served when they are con93
ducted “informally between the parties.” Based on this criterion, it
would seem that the courts could allow for an almost unlimited variety
of nonparty interventions, as they appear more concerned with encouraging and protecting settlement communications than they are
with limiting communications based on relationships.
Irwin also made clear that the settlement privilege from Goodyear
would not be narrowly tailored to the facts supporting the latter’s holding. In Irwin, the plaintiff’s expert witnesses learned of, and disclosed
in their reports, settlement communications made by the defendant;
the plaintiff was thus sanctioned by the magistrate judge for violating
94
the Goodyear settlement privilege. On appeal, the court explained
that “[t]he fact that the Sixth Circuit did not approve the identical
sanction does not demonstrate the unreasonableness of the sanction
imposed in this case”; the experts had disturbed the sanctity of a set95
tlement negotiation, and no alternative sanction would suffice. While
the circumstances were different from those of this Comment’s specific
inquiry, the district court demonstrated an intent to broadly protect
communications in furtherance of settlement.
Thus, unsurprisingly, it is likely that the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit and its district courts would look favorably on nonparty
settlement communications in furtherance of party settlement. Giv91

No. 04-0568, 2007 WL 518866, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2007) (quoting what
was then the Western District of Michigan’s Local Rule 16.2(e)).
92
See id. (“[I]nformation disclosed during the ADR process shall not be revealed
to any one [sic] else . . . .” (quoting what was then the Western District of Michigan’s
Local Rule 16.2(e))).
93
Id. at *3 (emphasis added) (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles
Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir. 2003)).
94
See id. at *1 (“The Magistrate Judge reasoned that, regardless of whether Plaintiff acted with bad faith, Plaintiff was solely at fault for the breach of confidentiality
. . . [and] the only appropriate remedy was to strike Plaintiff’s expert witnesses.”).
95
Id. at *4.
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en that this circuit has continually espoused protection for settlement communications with virtually no limitation, it is reasonable to
believe that Rule 408 would apply to the communications at issue in
the Sixth Circuit.
III. THE FINAL LAP: RECOMMENDATIONS TO PRACTITIONERS
While there is an unfortunate absence of direct authority offering
counsel to practitioners seeking to engage in settlement communications with nonparties to their dispute, the weight of the available authority is sufficient to derive a number of conclusions. Broadly speaking, the text of Rule 408 does not facially prohibit nonparty settlement
communications, and the previous discussion of policy suggests that in
the federal courts of appeals there will be a significant presumption in
96
favor of encouraging the settlement of lawsuits. Further, the analysis
of the applicability of the Rule in the federal courts of appeals leads to
more specific recommendations.
Practitioners should feel most comfortable engaging in nonparty
settlement communications in the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits. Given that the Sixth Circuit has recognized a general settlement privilege and has broadly and continually stated its intent to protect communications in furtherance of settlement, it would
be extremely unlikely for a judge in that circuit to hold that either
Rule 408 or the settlement privilege does not apply to this situation.
Though the Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have yet to go
as far as the Sixth, their acknowledgement of the applicability of Rule
408 to internal work product that is not communicated to a party in
the dispute—and their reliance on the policy behind the Rule—is sufficiently analogous to create a high likelihood of a favorable outcome.
Practitioners should also feel reasonably comfortable engaging in
such communications in the First and Ninth Circuits. It is reasonable
to assume that these courts, which have specifically appealed to policy
considerations in confronting the ambiguity in Rule 408’s treatment
of third-party settlement negotiations arising from the initial dispute,
would also appeal to policy considerations if confronted with this issue. Because the policy argument is strong, the courts would likely be
supportive of extending protection to such communications.
Practitioners in the remaining circuits do not have enough case law
to make a confident decision. Because the Tenth Circuit has held that
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communications even vaguely in furtherance of settlement will be protected, there is a strong argument that its obvious encouragement of
settlement would lead to a positive outcome in this situation. Similarly,
because the Second and Fourth Circuits have given Rule 408’s policy
interests great deference in the face of competing interests, there is a
good argument that they would do the same in this case. Because these
decisions dealt exclusively with parties to the litigation, however, the
decisions are not sufficiently analogous to warrant deference.
Although the Seventh Circuit certainly has not put forth any opinions that would run contrary to protecting the communications at
issue, it has not touched upon anything remotely analogous to nonparty settlement communications, and practitioners should thus proceed with caution. In addition, while the decisions of the D.C. Circuit’s district courts could logically be grouped with those of the First
and Ninth Circuits, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has not
itself addressed the issue.
Finally, aside from these specific recommendations, it should be
reiterated that the courts of appeals have acknowledged a broad policy
of encouraging the settlement of lawsuits. Thus, even where there is
not enough case law on which to base an adequate suggestion, it would
not be unreasonable for practitioners to engage in such communications if the communications would otherwise be particularly advantageous. Given that the text of Rule 408 suggests that any genuine settlement negotiation is protected, that the two distinct policy goals at the
foundation of the Rule are better served by the extension of its scope to
nonparties, and that the federal courts have protected settlement
communications in a wide variety of different circumstances, communications made to nonparties could reasonably be entertained if they are
undertaken in genuine furtherance of settlement.
CONCLUSION
In the end, Kentucky Speedway and NASCAR never came to a settlement agreement, and the Sixth Circuit eventually affirmed the dis97
trict court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of NASCAR. Perhaps the outcome would have been different if the parties had been
assured that any and all of their settlement negotiations would be protected by the Federal Rules of Evidence. In any event, if the public
policy encouraging the settlement of lawsuits is as important as both
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the courts and the literature suggest, then it is essential that practitioners be provided the means by which to become aware of the true
scope of the settlement negotiations covered by Rule 408, including
those regarding nonparties to a lawsuit.
While the principal goal of this Comment is to provide some direction to practitioners frustrated by the ambiguity of nonparty settlement
negotiations under the Federal Rules, my hope is that others will soon
confront this issue and elaborate on my analysis in a more sophisticated way. Settlement negotiations occur too often and are too important to the federal system to allow for such an ambiguity to continue
enjoying uncritical deference in the literature.

